At the beginning of the past …nancial crisis sponsoring banks rescued their structured investment vehicles (SIVs) despite of lack of contractual obligation to do so. I show that this outcome may arise as the equilibrium of a signaling game between banks and their debt investors when a negative shock a¤ects the correlated asset returns of a fraction of banks and their sponsored vehicles. In equilibrium, the rescue is interpreted as a good signal and reduces the re…nancing costs of the sponsoring bank. If banks' leverage is high or the negative shock is sizable enough, the equilibrium is a pooling one in which all banks rescue. When the aggregate …nancial sector is close to insolvency, banks'expected net worth would increase if rescues were banned. The model can be extended to discuss the circumstances in which all banks collapse after rescuing their vehicles.
Introduction
The 2007-2009 …nancial crisis was rife with situations in which banks provided support beyond their contractual obligations to sponsored subsidiaries in the shadow banking system.
A prominent example occurred in the structured investment vehicles (SIVs) industry. These o¤-balance sheet conduits experienced problems to re…nance their maturing debt due to investors'concerns on their exposure to subprime losses.
1 When the whole industry was at the eve of default, most sponsor banks stepped in and rescued their SIVs even though they
were not contractually obliged to do so.
Regulators attributed these and similar voluntary support decisions to the reputational concerns of the sponsors. And the potential negative impact of these rescues on bank capitalization opened a debate on the regulation of implicit support and "reputational risk"
in banking. 2 Yet, the precise nature of this risk and why voluntary support decisions may weaken the banks is not obvious. In fact, the existing literature predicts that sponsors will not give support during a severe downturn (Gorton and Souleles, 2006 , Ordoñez, 2013 , and Parlatore, 2013 . So, why did sponsor banks rescue their SIVs? What reputation was at stake and why was it so valuable during a crisis? And …nally, should regulators have intervened and banned these rescues in order to protect the banking system?
To address these questions, this paper develops a reputational theory of banks'voluntary rescue of their sponsored entities in the midst of a crisis. Although the theory may also apply to subsidiaries such as money market funds or hedge funds, the model focuses, for concreteness, on the rescues of SIVs. 3 Banks and their sponsored vehicles have long-term assets and short-term debt to be re…nanced. At the initial date a negative aggregate shock a¤ects the assets held by some of the banks and their vehicles and divides the bank-vehicle pairs into two types, say, good and bad. Crucially, the arrival of the aggregate shock is 1 SIVs debt consisted of asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) and medium term notes (MTN) in a typical ratio 2 to 5. Explicit debt guarantees from the sponsor covered no more than 30% of the ABCP, while MTNs were not guaranteed at all. For a description of the reasons why o¤-balance sheet conduits su¤ered re…nancing problems in the second half of 2007, see Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2010) . 2 See BCBS (2009) and FSB (2012) . 3 For a detail account of the rise, demise, and rescue of the SIVs industry, see Appendix A. Brady et al. (2012) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012) document the relevance of sponsor support in the money market fund industry during the past …nancial crisis. The rescue by Bear Stearns of two of its hedge funds in July 2007 was largely covered by the media. public information but the type of a pair bank-vehicle is private information of the bank.
The negative shock is bad enough to trigger a run on all vehicles in spite of the fact that good vehicles are fundamentally solvent (i.e. with perfect information they would be able to re…nance their debt). In this context, banks face a decision on whether to rescue their vehicles taking into account its non-trivial impact on the cost of re…nancing their own debt.
Banks …nance these rescues by raising new debt that is assumed to be junior to banks' preexisting debt.
Two results drive the types of equilibria that may arise in this economy. First, debt issued by a good bank is fundamentally more valuable. So, the pricing of debt depends on investors'beliefs on the quality of the issuer and any non fully separating equilibrium involves some debt overpricing bene…ts for bad banks. Second, good banks have higher incentives to rescue their vehicles than bad banks, in spite of bad banks potential "risk shifting"motives to rescue their vehicles. As a result, the decision to rescue is interpreted by the investors as a good signal.
I show that in equilibrium all good banks rescue their vehicles, whereas bad banks may or may not do so. Bad banks trade o¤ the fundamental costs of rescuing their (bad) vehicles with the debt overpricing bene…ts of keeping their own type unrevealed. The debt overpricing bene…ts of the rescue are increasing in the market expectation on the quality of a rescuing bank, which leads to a unique equilibrium that can be of three types: pooling in which all banks rescue, semiseparating in which good banks and a fraction of bad banks rescue, and separating in which only good banks rescue.
The model predicts the pooling equilibrium to arise when either banks'debt is very large or the return of the assets held by bad institutions is very low. Both conditions were likely satis…ed in 2007. First, banks were highly levered and an important fraction of their debt had to be regularly re…nanced in wholesale markets due to its very short maturity (interbank loans, commercial paper, repos). Second, the subprime crisis meant a severe downward updating of the fundamental value of some of the backing assets.
Regulators have manifested concern about the risk these rescues pose to the banking system. To assess the impact of a possible regulatory response to this concern, I analyze the e¤ects of a ban on voluntary rescues. 4 In a pooling equilibrium, the ban reduces the welfare of vehicles'debtholders to the same extent that it increases the average net worth of banks since it avoids the rescue of vehicles which are on average insolvent. The net worth of bad banks always increases as a result of the ban and, interestingly, when the aggregate …nancial sector is close to insolvency, that of good banks as well. 5 The last e¤ect arises because of the dilution associated with the underpricing of their debt in the pooling equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, the e¤ects of a ban are reversed: vehicles' debtholders average welfare increases whereas banks'average net worth decreases.
In an extension of the model I analyze the e¤ect of relaxing the assumption that new debt raised for the …nancing of the rescue is junior to banks'preexisting debt. I …nd that only when the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent this relative seniority is relevant in equilibrium. In these cases if new …nancing is junior, banks try to rescue their vehicles but investors refuse to supply the additional funds, rescues are not completed and vehicles fail.
If new …nancing is senior, banks obtain …nancing for the rescues in a …rst stage but then they are not able to re…nance their debt, leading to systemic collapse. 6 This result identi…es a new channel through which the bankruptcy privileges of repurchase agreements may propagate distress through the …nancial system.
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In another extension of the model I allow each bank to sponsor several vehicles with and without explicit support guarantees. 8 I show that if vehicles su¤er a run and sponsors are obliged to rescue some of them, they have greater incentives to voluntarily support the rest.
This complementarity between contractual and voluntary support may be yet an additional reason why banks rescued their SIVs in the crisis. 4 This policy has been adopted by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA, 2012). 5 I say that the aggregate …nancial sector is solvent, insolvent, when the di¤erence between the aggregate expected payo¤ of its assets and the face value of maturing debt is positive, negative, respectively. 6 The structuring of the rescues in fall 2007 typically included the use of liquid assets of the sponsor combined with repos collateralized by the vehicles' assets in a way that de facto may have rendered new …nancing senior. 7 Other negative e¤ects of the bankruptcy privileges of repurchase agreements pointed out in the literature are that they lead to …re-sales Skeel, 2012, and Perotti, 2012) and increase ex-ante hedging costs (Bolton and Oehmke, 2013) . 8 As an example, in 2007 Citigroup was the sponsor of nine fully supported ABCP conduits and seven non explicitly supported SIVs.
Related literature This paper belongs to the theoretical literature that has analyzed voluntary support from sponsoring institutions. The existing papers share the prediction -contrary to my model-that a rescue is less likely under adverse economic circumstances.
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In Ordoñez (2013) the support decision is based on reputational concerns. He assumes the reputational bene…ts of support to be increasing in the value of new investment opportunities, which means that sponsors are less likely to support their subsidiaries after a severe deterioration of the economy. In Gorton and Souleles (2006) voluntary support arises as a form of collusion between sponsors and investors in conduits in a repeated context. 10 Since collusion is sustained by the value of future collaboration, banks have less incentives to rescue their vehicles in the midst of an economic crisis. Finally, Parlatore (2013) builds a model of delegated portfolio management in which the sponsor obtains fees that are proportional to the market price of assets under management and thus its incentives to support a subsidiary are reduced after a negative shock.
My paper is also connected to earlier contributions in which signaling concerns interact with debt dilution costs. 11 In John and Nachman (1985) reputation, understood as information about a …rm's type, a¤ects the debt dilution costs associated to the …nancing of future investment oportunities. They show that reputation concerns reduce the debt overhang problem identi…ed by Myers (1977) . In Diamond (1991) reputation built over time reduces a moral hazard problem and allows …rms to switch from banks'monitored …nance to unmonitored market …nance.
The interaction between reputation concerns and transfers of value among security holders has also been found in other corporate …nance contexts. In Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) a …rm complies with an unenforceable …nancial contract in order to improve investors' perception on its capability to satisfy (similar) contracts in the future. In Thakor (2005) banks screen borrowers before o¤ering them loan commitments that could be withdrawn under material adverse change clauses. He shows that during booms banks do not refuse 9 In my model the existence of the shadow banking system is taken as given. Recent theoretical work about the emergence and fragility of shadow banks includes Parlour and Plantin (2008) , Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2012) and Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2013) . (See the latter for a survey of this literature). 10 The same mechanism leads banks to rescue borrowers in distress in Dinc (2000) . 11 The in ‡uential paper of Myers and Majluf (1984) gave raise to a literature where security design was directed to reduce the dilution costs associated with asymmetric information (see e.g. Nachman and Noe, 1994 , DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999 , Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001 lending to bad projects in order to preserve their screening reputation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ingredients of the model. Section 3 …nds the equilibrium of the model and discusses how changes of parameters a¤ect it. Section 4 analyzes the welfare e¤ects of a ban on rescues. Section 5 extends the model along several dimensions and discusses the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
Appendix A describes the SIV industry and reviews the events that led sponsor banks to rescue these vehicles in the recent crisis. All proofs are in Appendix B.
The model
There are two dates t = 0; 1; and two classes of agents in the economy: bankers and investors.
Every banker owns a bank, and every bank sponsors a vehicle.
Bankers
There is a continuum of measure one of bankers. Bankers maximize the expected value of their terminal wealth. Each banker owns a bank with asset size Z and each bank sponsors a vehicle with asset size 1. Banks and vehicles have preexisting debt of face value D B and D S ; respectively, that they need to re…nance at t = 0. The bank is the residual claimant of its vehicle, subject to limited liability. And bankers are the residual claimants of banks, also subject to limited liability. The sponsor bank has not granted any contractual guarantees to its vehicle, i.e. it is not at all obliged by the debts of its vehicle.
Prior to t = 0; all banks and vehicles invested in ex ante identical assets. But at t = 0 a negative shock a¤ects the assets of a fraction 1 of the bank-vehicle pairs that as a result become bad (j = b) while the assets of the una¤ected fraction remain good (j = g). 12 The type of the pair bank-vehicle is private information of the banker who owns the corresponding bank.
12 I capture in this simple way positive correlation on the quality of the assets held by institutions that belong to the parent company. The correlation might be due to characteristics of the parent, e.g., screening ability at origination, quality of lending opportunities, skills in the management of investment portfolios, geographical specialization, etc. As discussed in Section 5.4 the model works as well if the type of the bank determines the quality of the vehicle's asset and also of a fraction of the assets on the bank balance sheet, while the quality of the assets on the rest of the bank balance sheet is public information.
The gross return at t = 1 of the assets of type j = g; b is a random variable Y j with support [0; +1) and pdf f j (y) > 0 for all y > 0. Y g dominates Y b in the sense of the strictly monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property:
Accordingly, high returns are relatively more likely when the asset is good, and this is more so the higher the returns are. MLR dominance implies in particular that Y g strictly …rst order stocastically dominates Y b and, thus,
Investors
At t = 0 there is a large number of risk-neutral investors with deep pockets that require an expected rate of return on their funds normalized to zero. They compete for buying debt issued by either banks or vehicles. Some of them hold banks and vehicles'maturing debt. In case a bank or vehicle is not able to re…nance its debt, the institution fails and debtholders take ownership of its assets in a frictionless manner.
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2.3 Sequence of events after a run on the vehicles I will focus on a situation in which vehicles are not able to re…nance their debt at t = 0.
Since investors do not observe vehicles'types, such inability arises when the unconditional expected payo¤ of a vehicle is lower than the value of its debt:
The assumption implies in particular that E[Y b ] < D S ; so that bad vehicles are fundamentally insolvent.
Regarding the banking sector, I assume that banks are on average solvent since otherwise they would also be unable to re…nance their debt:
13 Introducing bankruptcy costs would only a¤ect the analysis of the distributional welfare e¤ects of a ban on vehicles rescues (see Section 4) by adding an additional cost of this policy for vehicles'debtholders.
14 As a matter of terminology throughout the paper, when the expected value of the assets of an institution (bank or vehicle) is just equal to the face value of debt it has to re…nance I say that the institution is insolvent. The rationale is that there is no …nite promised repayment it could o¤er investors so that they would be willing to re…nance its debt.
In addition I make two additional assumptions that simplify the characterization of possible equilibria:
Assumption 3 states that good vehicles are fundamentally solvent.
16 Assumption 4 imposes a rather mild lower bound on the relative size of banks with respect to their vehicles.
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When vehicles are unable to re…nance their debt, banks may voluntarily rescue them.
I assume that the rescue cannot be funded by diluting the preexisting bank debtholders.
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So, when the rescue occurs, I consider it as part of a re…nancing arrangement between the bank, the vehicle and (new) debt investors whereby the latter provide the funds needed to repay both the bank and its vehicle's maturing debt, D B and D S ; while the vehicle's asset is transferred to the bank. The sequence of events at t = 0; represented in Figure 1 , is as follows:
1. Every bank chooses between rescuing its vehicle (a = 1) and not rescuing it (a = 0).
2. For every a 2 f0; 1g investors ask a promised repayment scheme R a based on their beliefs p a 2 [0; 1] on the probability that a bank is good conditional on its decision a.
Speci…cally:
(a) For a = 0 investors set a repayment R 0 in exchange for providing the funds D B the bank needs for its own re…nancing. I write R 0 = 1 if investors are not willing to supply them. 15 In Section 5.4 I discuss the e¤ect of relaxing these assumptions. 16 Assumption 1 and 3 imply that the fraction of bad types is su¢ ciently high:
17 For :5 it only imposes that Z 1; i.e. that the asset size of banks is no lower than that of their vehicles. 18 In other words, D B is senior to any debt that could be raised to re…nance D S : At t = 1 the non-liquidated institutions distribute the payo¤ of their assets to their stakeholders following the standard priority rules.
Equilibrium
Banks and investors play a sequential game with imperfect information. The concept of equilibrium is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) cum the re…nement D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987) . Thus equilibrium consists of a tuple (a j ); (R a ); (p a ) of (possibly mixed) actions (a j )
for every bank type j, some required promised schemes (R a ) set by investors and some beliefs (p a ) for investors, such that:
1. Banks' sequential rationality: For j 2 fg; bg; a j is optimal for a bank of type j given
2. Investors' competitive rationality: For a 2 f0; 1g; R a sets the lowest repayments for which investors break even given p a : In every case, if no break-even repayment exists, the corresponding R 0 ; R 1;F or R 1;N F is set equal to 1:
3. Belief consistency: If a 2 f0; 1g is on the equilibrium path, p a is determined by Bayes' rule.
4. Re…nement D1: If a 2 f0; 1g is o¤-equilibrium, p a satis…es re…nement D1, i.e. if there exists j 2 fg; bg such that for j 0 6 = j the following strict set inclusion is satis…ed:
fR a : bank j weakly prefers to deviate from equilibrium to ag ( ( fR a : bank j 0 weakly prefers to deviate from equilibrium to ag ;
The …rst three equilibrium conditions correspond to PBE. This equilibrium concept imposes no restriction on investors'beliefs o¤-equilibrium, which generally leads to multiplicity of equilibria. Re…nements that impose investors'beliefs to be "reasonable" when they observe o¤-equilibrium actions narrow down the equilibrium set. Re…nement D1, which is a simple and common re…nement in the signaling literature, is su¢ cient for uniqueness of equilibrium in my model in most of the parameter regions. 20 The intuition behind this re…nement is that o¤-equilibrium beliefs should be based on identifying the types that have the most to gain from deviating from equilibrium.
Before solving the game between banks and investors I discuss next as a benchmark the economy with perfectly informed investors. 20 In the context of …nancing decisions with asymmetric information, D1 has been used in, for example, Nachman and Noe (1994) and DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) . Re…nement D1 is a stronger re…nement than both the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and Divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987) , which are insu¢ cient to ensure uniqueness in my model.
The perfect information benchmark
Assumption 3 states that a good vehicle is fundamentally solvent and therefore it is able to re…nance its debt and to generate an expected residual payo¤ to bankers of E[Y g ] D S > 0 at t = 0. On the other hand, Assumption 1 implies that a bad vehicle is fundamentally insolvent and thus unable to re…nance its debt. Under perfect information, a bad bank would not raise additional debt in order to rescue its vehicle because doing so would be detrimental to its owners whose expected payo¤ would decline in D S E[Y b ] > 0: As a result, bad vehicles would fail.
Asymmetric information and debt mispricing
To analyze the impact of asymmetric information on debt pricing, condider a bank of type j 2 fg; bg holding some generic X > 0 units of its asset and with debt that promises to pay R at t = 1: Let the expected payo¤ of this debt be denoted by
Since the return Y g …rst order stochastically dominates Y b we have
so the debt issued by a good bank has a greater expected payo¤ than that issued by a bad bank. Intuitively, this happens because bad banks default more frequently. If investors' belief on the probability that the bank is good is p, the valuation of its debt will be
Henceforth, the promised repayment R that investors would ask in order to provide D units of funds to the bank at t = 0 satis…es
Let R(X; D; p) denote the solution to the equation above, if it exists, and adopt the convention R(X; D; p) = 1 when it does not exist. Clearly, R(X; D; p) is strictly decreasing in X and p; and strictly increasing in D:
The expected net worth of the bank when it has to obtain D units of debt funding is
Note that the convention R(X; D; p) = 1 implies j (X; D; p) = 0 when the bank is not able to …nance the D units of funds it requires (and fails).
Finally, it is useful to de…ne the debt mispricing as
The following lemma summarizes the properties of the debt mispricing and its e¤ect on banks'expected net worth:
The expected net worth of a bank of type j 2 fg; bg that has X > 0 units of its asset and has to raise D units of debt when investors'belief on its quality is p is: The lemma states that when banks are able to obtain …nancing bad (good) banks'debt is overpriced (underpriced), which increases (decreases) their expected net worth relative to the perfect information case. From the perspective of bad banks, as p increases investors' misperception on their type increases and thus also the overpricing M b (X; D; p) of their debt.
The opposite happens with the underpricing M g (X; D; p) of good banks'debt.
When the promised repayment R on debt increases, investors get a higher repayment only on non default states. Since high returns are more likely to happen for the good bank, the expected payo¤ of the debt issued by a good bank grows faster than that issued by a bad one, and thus their di¤erence increases. Now, when D increases, investors'required promised repayment also does and hence the absolute values of debt mispricings M b (X; D; p)
and M g (X; D; p) also increase. Finally, when X increases banks have more collateral to satisfy their debt promises which reduces the absolute values of debt mispricings.
Rescuing as a signal of quality
Suppose investors ask promised repayment schemes R 1 ; R 0 in order to supply the funds that rescuing and not rescuing banks need, respectively. I say that banks of type j have more incentives to rescue than banks of type j 0 6 = j if in case the latter …nd it weakly optimal to rescue then the former …nd it strictly optimal.
The fact that banks' types (and the asymmetric information about them) a¤ect the Lemma 2 For any promised repayment schemes R 1 ; R 0 with R 1;F < 1 asked by investors for the re…nancing of rescuing and not rescuing banks, respectively, good banks have more incentives to rescue than bad banks.
Because of this "single-crossing"type of result, the rescue decision (a = 1) is going to be systematically interpreted by investors as a signal of quality. A …rst implication is:
Corollary 1 If the aggregate …nancial sector is solvent, i.e. if
in equilibrium all good banks decide to rescue and the rescues can be …nanced.
Equilibrium characterization
Let us …nd the equilibrium of the model. Let us start with the case of a …nancial sector that is solvent on the aggregate. Then, in equilibrium all good banks decide to rescue and rescues are …nanced. Bayesian compatibility on investors'beliefs imposes: Let us …rst analyze when a semiseparating equilibrium exists. Such an equilibrium is characterized by investors' beliefs p 1 2 ( ; 1) and p 0 = 0; investors' required repayments R 1;F < 1 and R 0 , such that investors'participation constraints and banks incentive compatibility constraints are satis…ed:
(P C 1 ) states that R 1;F is such that investors'break even when they supply D B + D S units of funds to rescuing banks that hold Z + 1 units of assets with expected quality p 1 :
is analogous. In a semiseparating equilibrium bad banks are indi¤erent between rescuing or not. According to this, (IC b ) states that the expected net worth of a bad bank that rescues (LHS) is equal to the expected net worth of a bad bank that does not rescue (RHS). Finally, (IC g ) states that good banks expected net worth is weakly higher if they rescue.
The indi¤erence condition in (IC b ) and R 1;F < 1 imply that R 0 < 1 and banks that do not rescue obtain the required funds. In addition, Lemma 2 states that (IC g ) is redundant
given (IC b ). Now, substituting (P C 1 ) and (P C 0 ) in (IC b ) and using equation (8) in Lemma 1, the equilibrium conditions collapse into a single equation in p 1 :
21 Strictly speaking, if the equilibrium is pooling with rescue, p 0 is not pinned-down by Bayesian compatibility. In this case Proposition 2 and condition D1 imply that p 0 = 0:
22 Let us highlight that since R 1;F < 1 the value of R 1;N F is irrelevant.
Using that M b (Z; D B ; 0) = 0 since R(Z; D B ; 0) = R 0 < 1 and simplifying the equality above we obtain:
A semiseparating equilibrium exists if this equation has a solution with p 1 2 ( ; 1):
Equation (9) To further understand the impact of the rescue decision on a bad bank, the debt overpricing bene…ts that it enjoys when rescuing can be split into two components: First, there is the debt overpricing bene…t of the re…nancing of its original balance sheet which is
Second, there is the incremental bene…t of funding the rescue with overpriced debt, which can residually be computed as which imply that the ratio of debt to market value of assets is 75% for banks and 105% for vehicles. expected net worth is lower if it rescues. As p 1 increases, a bad bank that rescues enjoys higher debt overpricing bene…ts both in the re…nancing of its original balance sheet and in the funding of the rescue, and thus the total overpricing bene…ts also increase. When the curves describing the debt overpricing bene…ts and fundamental costs of a rescue for a bad bank intersect the bad bank is indi¤erent between rescuing or not. For higher investors'belief p 1 it …nds it optimal to rescue. If the curves intersect in a point p 1 2 ( ; 1) the economy has a semiseparating equilibrium. Let denote the fraction of bad banks that rescue. After determining p 1 , this fraction can be recursively computed out of the Bayesian compatibility of beliefs:
If the intersection point p 1 tends to 1 the semiseparating equilibrium approaches a separating one. When, on the other hand, p 1 tends to the equilibrium tends to a pooling one. These "limiting" equilibria extend naturally to the case in which the curves curves do not intersect in the interval ( ; 1): The complete characterization of equilibria is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the aggregate …nancial sector is solvent, the equilibrium is unique, all banks are able to re…nance their debt and rescues are …nanced. The equilibrium is:
1. Separating if and only if
2. Semiseparating if and only if there exists p 2 ( ; 1) such that
in which case the fraction of bad banks that rescue their vehicles is =
3. Pooling if and only if
Let us now …nd the equilibrium when the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent. Using
Assumptions 3 and 4 it is easy to realize that
and bad banks are fundamentally insolvent. 23 Since a bad bank that reveals its type is not able to re…nance its debt and fails at t = 0; bad banks will always …nd optimal to pool with good banks in their rescue decision. Taking into account that investors refuse to …nance a rescue intended by a bank perceived as average, we can obtain the following characterization of equilibria:
Assumption 3 implies that
which can be written as
Now, Assumption 4 states that Z (1 ) 0 and hence
Proposition 2 If the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent, there is multiplicity of equilibria. For all 2 (0; 1]; a fraction of good banks and a fraction of bad banks deciding to rescue constitutes an equilibrium, and all equilibria are of this form. In all equilibria, all banks are able to re…nance their debt but rescues are not …nanced. Finally, the expected payo¤ for each agent is constant in all the equilibria.
The reason why multiplicity of equilibria arises is that if investors'beliefs are p 1 = p 0 = ; then they do not …nance rescues and hence banks are indi¤erent between rescuing or not which is Bayesian compatible with investors'beliefs. In order to make notation easier, out of these essentially equivalent equilibria, I choose the pooling one in which all banks try to rescue. The di¤erent types of equilibrium in the admissible debt space are illustrated in Figure   3 . When D B increases bad banks obtain more debt overpricing bene…ts when they rescue their vehicles and the fraction of them that do so in equilibrium increases. The economy moves from a separating equilibrium with no bad banks rescuing, to a semiseparating one in which some bad banks rescue, and then to a pooling equilibrium in which all banks rescue.
Equilibrium regions
The economy enters the pooling region signi…cantly below the threshold
which bad banks become fundamentally insolvent. 24 In terms of the other exogenous parameters of the model the admissible debt space is given by the rectangle: 
so that, in particular, bad banks are just fundamentally insolvent for = 1. 
shareholders of the sponsor bank (the banker). 26 In this section I analyze the distributional welfare e¤ects of a ban on vehicle rescues that, a fortiori, deters also banks from the possibility to signal their types.
If banks are not allowed to rescue their vehicles, these fail at t = 0 and vehicles debtholders take ownership of vehicles assets. The expected welfare of vehicles debtholders is thus:
Since after a ban banks are pooled when re…nancing their D B units of debt at t = 0, the expected net worth of a bank of type j is:
Comparing these welfare expressions to their analogous in the no ban economy, which depend on the endogenous fraction of bad banks that rescue their vehicles, it is possible to prove the following result:
Proposition 5 Let us give some intuitions for these results. In the no ban economy the expected welfare of vehicles debtholders is:
Comparing to their welfare in the ban economy in (16) we deduce that the ban trivially decreases vehicles debtholders welfare when = 1 but, interestingly, the ban increases their welfare when = 0: The reason is that in a separating equilibrium the fundamentally solvent vehicles are rescued and vehicles debtholders take ownership only of the assets of the failing vehicles which are bad. Generally, whether or not these agents bene…t from the ban will depend on the fraction + (1 ) of them that are rescued in the no ban economy and on the full repayment D S they receive in case of rescue. The proposition states that when D B
is below a threshold D 0 B the economy is "closer" to the separating case than to the pooling one and these agents bene…t from a ban.
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The ban always increases the expected net worth of bad banks since it allows them to pool the re…nancing of their debt without the need to incur the costly rescue of their vehicles.
Interestingly also, despite the fact that good vehicles are fundamentally solvent, the e¤ect of the ban on the expected net worth of good banks is also ambiguous. Using expressions in (8) and (17), the expected net worth of good banks increases with the ban if
The LHS accounts for the reduction in good banks'debt underpricing due to the ban and can be interpreted as the (signed) bene…ts of the ban for these agents. 28 In the RHS there is the fundamental bene…t of the rescue for good banks and can be interpreted as the cost of the ban for them. Since M g (Z + 1; D B + D S ; p) is decreasing in p and p is decreasing in ; inequality (19) could be satis…ed for high. The proposition states that this is the case when D B is above the threshold F(D S ). When D S increases the fundamental bene…t of a rescue for a good bank decreases while the equilibrium debt underpricing costs are increased.
In order to restablish equality in (19), D B has to decrease which explains why the threshold
(See the proof of the proposition for details). 27 Let us highlight that this threshold is independent of the value of D S even though the latter a¤ects both and the repayment debtholders of rescued vehicles obtain. For details see the proof of Proposition 5. 28 It is easy to prove that the term is positive for = 1 , p = : It is trivially negative for = 0 , p = 1: 
Seniority of preexisting bank debt
In the model preexisting bank debt is senior to debt raised for the …nancing of the rescue.
As a result, the rescue of a vehicle cannot dilute bank debtholders and, when the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent, banks try to rescue their vehicles but investors refuse to provide them the additional required funding. However, the real rescues of the fall of 2007 were frequently structured in a way that might have diluted banks'preexisting debtholders. First, banks pledged the vehicles'assets in repurchase agreements, and the bankruptcy privileges these transactions enjoy make repo lenders e¤ectively senior to other creditors. 29 Second,
given the haircuts applied to repo transactions, banks used part of their own liquid funds in repaying vehicles'debt.
In order to extend the model to account for the possibility of diluting banks debt, let us assume that a rescue is the following bi-party deal: the vehicle's asset is transferred to the bank and its debt is swapped into bank debt with the same principal as the vehicle's debt and the same maturity as the bank's original debt. A rescuing bank then tries to raise D B + D S units of funds to repay its debtholders (including its new debtholders coming from the debt swap). If investors are not willing to supply these funds the bank fails and its Z + 1 units of assets are distributed pari passu among all its debtholders. The only di¤erence with respect to the baseline model is that intended rescues are always accomplished even if banks are unable to re…nance their overall new debt soon after.
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Speci…cally, in the region where the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent, banks are (unconditionally) insolvent after completing their rescues and investors refuse to re…nance them, so the whole banking system collapses at t = 0: In other words, the run on SIVs propagate to a run on banks due to their costly rescue decisions.
Du¢ e and Skeel (2012) and Perotti (2012) have pointed out that the exemption from the automatic stay granted to repurchase agreements creates social costs because it increases …rms'incentives to become too-big-to-fail and also the market impact of collateral …re sales. 31 Bolton and Oehmke (2013) …nd that these bankruptcy privileges increase the ex-ante cost of hedging cash- ‡ow risk using repos or other derivatives. These authors propose the elimination (in some circumstances) of these bankruptcy privileges. My model of voluntary rescues, by
showing that banks' signaling concerns together with the e¤ective seniority of repos may prove destabilizing for the …nancial sector, adds another reason against these privileges.
30 Formally, R 1 consists of a single promised repayment in order to supply D B + D S units of funds instead of a contingent pair of promised repayments (R 1;F ; R 1;N F ): It can be proved that since banks are solvent in the aggregate whereas vehicles are not, vehicles'debtholders would accept the exchange of their debt for bank debt even if they are not fully repaid by the banks after the rescue, i.e. when R 1 = 1.
31 Antinol… et al. (2013) develop a trade-o¤ theory in which the …re sales social costs of safe harbor privileges may be o¤set by the increase they induce in the liquidity of collateral.
Banks with guaranteed vehicles
In the run-up to the 2007 …nancial crisis banks sponsored several types of o¤-balance sheet ABCP conduits that di¤ered on the extent of support guarantees granted to them. In order to analyze how the presence of explicitly guaranteed vehicles a¤ects banks' incentives to rescue their unguaranteed vehicles, I extend the model and assume that every bank sponsors a second guaranteed vehicle. At t = 0 this vehicle has Z > 0 units of the asset of quality j;
where j is the type of its sponsor bank, and ZD S units of guaranteed debt that has to be re…nanced. 32 The guarantee implies that if investors are not willing to re…nance the vehicle the sponsor bank is contractually obliged to rescue it. 
From here we have that:
Proposition 6 Let (Z) be the fraction of bad banks that rescue their unguaranteed vehicles in equilibrium when the size of the guranteed vehicles is Z 0.
is strictly increasing in Z:
When banks are contractually forced to bring some vehicles back on balance sheet, the degree of asymmetric information in the banking system increases and bad banks value more preserving their private information (i.e. the debt overpricing bene…ts of a rescue in the LHS of (20) increase). As a consequence, in equilibrium the fraction of bad banks that rescue the unguaranteed vehicle increases. 
Reputation concerns and future …nancing
Regulators and rating agencies have provided yet another view on the reasons why a sponsor may voluntarily support its conduits: the sponsor's concern that "failure to provide support would damage its future access to the asset-backed securities market" (OCC, 2002, p.3) . 
33 The standard argument for the value created by recourse is that it reduces moral hazard/adverse selection problems at origination (Gorton and Souleles, 2006) . But recourse may be costly from a regulatory perspective. Since 2004 bank regulators in the US required sponsors to hold capital requirements against the provision of liquidity guarantees to conduits at a conversion factor of 10% relative to on-balance sheet …nancing. In Europe, banks that had adopted Basel II were applied a conversion factor of 20% while for those under Basel I it was 0%.
34 See also FitchIBCA (1999, p. 4) . 35 I could allow for positive debt D 0 > 0 at t = 0 which would generate a current re…nancing concern in banks rescue decisions. In order not to mix the two channels I assume D 0 = 0: whether or not to rescue them. In case they do, the debt they issue in order to …nance the rescue has to be re…nanced at t = 1=2:
Using an analogous to Lemma 2 it can be proven that in equilibrium good banks rescue their vehicles at t = 0 and take the investment opportunity at t = 1=2: Bad banks in their rescue decision trade-o¤ the fundamental costs of the rescue and the bene…ts of improving the cost of …nancing the future investment opportunity. If rescuing banks are perceived to be of quality p bad banks'indi¤erence condition analogous to (13) can be written as:
The new term max(D B Z 1=2 E[Y b ]; 0) captures the fact that in case bad banks'investment opportunity at t = 1=2 has negative fundamental NPV, the banks have the option not to invest. This option reduces bad banks' incentives to rescue their vehicles with respect to the baseline model. I now reconduct the exercise at the end of Section 3.4 on the e¤ect of the severity of the negative shock on the equilibrium of the future …nancing model. Figure   6 shows the fraction of bad banks that rescue their vehicles in both models. 36 We observe that when bad banks'investment opportunity has positive fundamental NPV, the equilibria of both models coincide. However as the severity of the shock increases and investment for bad banks has fundamental negative NPV, each equilibrium evolves in opposing directions:
the future …nancing economy moves fast to a separating equilibrium, while the current re…-nancing one converges to a pooling equilibrium with rescue. This result suggests that, in the contractionary context of the end of 2007, preserving the reputation of banks'balance sheet was a more decisive factor on the rescue of SIVs than maintaining investors'con…dence on the future of banks'securitization business.
Robustness
In this Section I brie ‡y comment the robustness of the model to relaxing some of the main assumptions.
Imperfect positive correlation between banks and sponsored vehicles'assets The type of a bank determines the common quality of the assets of the bank and its vehicle. While some positive correlation is necessary for the results, the assumption of perfect correlation was adopted for simplicity. More speci…cally, all the mechanisms in the model are preserved if I incorporate in the balance sheet of banks also Z W units of a new asset with gross return W whose distribution is common knowledge (and independent from that of Y j ; j = g; b).
This asset can be thought as a traditional banking asset, whose quality is not a concern for investors, that di¤ers from the securitized assets of the baseline model, whose opacity generates asymmetric information.
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Fundamentally insolvent good vehicles If Assumption 3 is relaxed to allow for both types of vehicles to be fundamentally insolvent, i.e. if:
37 In the extension, the perfect correlation between some of the bank assets and vehicles' would capture that banks held tranches of the securitized and distribitued assets, that banks had on balance sheet the assets of similar previously rescued vehicles, and also that they were holding pools of assets waiting to be securitized and transferred to their vehicles when the crisis erupted. then also good banks rescuing their vehicles incur a positive fundamental cost. Since the validity of Lemma 2 does not depend on this assumption, the rescue decision is still a signal of quality. Hence, a good bank that rescues bene…ts from a reduction in debt underpricing costs that overweighs the fundamental costs of the rescue when these are not very important, i.e. when D S E[Y g ] is not very high. In this case the unique equilibrium of the economy is the one characterized in Section 3.4. In contrast, if D S is su¢ ciently high the unique equilibrium of the economy would be pooling with no rescue.
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Small size of banks relative to vehicles If Z is small and Assumption 4 is not satis…ed there are situations in which bad banks are solvent but the aggregate economy is insolvent.
In these cases there are two equilibria: the one characterized in Section 3.4 in which rescues are not …nanced and another one in which all good banks rescue, only a fraction of bad banks do so and rescues are …nanced. 39 The source of multiplicity is a complementarity between bad banks'actions and investors'beliefs on these actions that arises due to the possibility that investors refuse to …nance rescues when they believe many bad banks want to do so.
This possibility materializes in equilibrium only when the aggregate economy is insolvent and bad banks are fundamentally solvent.
Insured bank deposits The model can be extended to include a fraction of banks'debt in the form of insured deposits. Since in this case a smaller proportion of banks' debt is sensitive to investors' expectation on the quality of the bank, the incentives for banks to rescue are reduced. As a result, the fraction of bad banks that rescue their vehicles in equilibrium is reduced. 38 There is an intermediate range of values of D S for which there is multiplicity of equilibria. These equilibria are: the equilibrium in which all good banks rescue their vehicles, a pooling equilibrium with no rescue, and an unstable semiseparating equilibrium in which only a fraction of good banks rescue. The net worth of both types of banks is maximized in the pooling equilibrium with no rescue and a ban on rescues would be a way to coordinate banks on the outcome that is best for them. 39 The fraction of bad banks that rescue in this equilibrium is determined by equation (13).
Conclusions
In this paper I develop a signaling theory that explains sponsor banks voluntary support of their SIVs at the beginning of the 2007 …nancial crisis. In an economy in which debt investors have imperfect information on the institutions a¤ected by a negative shock, a bank that rescues its vehicle sends a positive signal because investors anticipate that good banks have more incentives to rescue than bad ones. As a result, in equilibrium the costs of re…nancing the balance sheet of the signaling bank are reduced and good banks always …nd it optimal to rescue their (solvent) vehicles. In contrast, a bad bank trades o¤ the fundamental costs of rescuing its (insolvent) vehicle with the debt overpricing bene…ts of keeping its own type unrevealed.
When the crisis started in August 2007 banks were highly levered and their short term debt required regular re…nancing in wholesale markets. In addition, agents'downward updating of the value of subprime associated assets was very severe. In circumstances like these, my model predicts a pooling equilibrium with rescue as the one we observed in reality. I also show that having vehicles with explicit support guarantees would further push in favor of the emergence of the pooling equilibrium regarding the rescue of the unguaranteed vehicles.
Regulators have manifested concern about the cost of these actions for the banking system. In the context of my model I show that if the aggregate …nancial sector is close to insolvency the net worth of all banks would increase with a ban on rescues that prevents them from engaging in this form of costly signaling. Furthermore, I also show that if the …nancing of rescues can dilute preexisting bank debt, vehicles inability to re…nance their debt may propagate to banks due to their costly rescue decisions. In these cases a ban on rescues avoids the collapse of the banking system.
Finally, some regulators and rating agencies argued that voluntary support was a response to sponsors fear to lose access to the securitization business in the future (if they had let their conduits fail). A minimal variation in the model allows me to capture this alternative reputation theory. However, I show that this concern for future …nancing is weaker when economic prospects are poorer, which suggests that this alternative reputational story is less plausible as an explanation of the events observed in the past …nancial crisis.
Since the mid 1980s, banks have been sponsoring ABCP conduits for the o¤-balance sheet funding of a varied range of assets. The main source of …nancing of these conduits is commercial paper (CP) that, as opposed to corporate CP, is secured by the conduits'assets and also enjoys from the "bankruptcy remoteness" of the conduits. By June 2007 these conduits constituted an important part of the shadow banking system with outstanding ABCP amounting to $1.3 trillion, $903 billion of which were sponsored by banks. There are four types of ABCP conduits (single-seller, multiseller, securities arbitrage vehicles and SIVs) that di¤er on the types of assets they hold, their liability structure, their governing accounting rules and, most importantly for the focus of this paper, on the contractual support guarantees from their sponsors. In order to achieve the maximum rating on the liabilities issued by their conduits and make them eligible for institutional investors such as MMMFs, sponsors extend support facilities to their conduits. These can require the sponsor to pay o¤ the full principal of maturing ABCP in case the conduit is not able to roll it over at the market (full support) or only a fraction of it (partial support).
40 SIVs were the only partially supported ABCP conduits. SIVs engage in spread lending by investing in highly-rated long-term securities that are …nanced by the issuance of ABCP and medium term notes (MTN) in a typical ratio of 2:5. In order to provide some credit risk protection to their investors, SIVs also issue subordinated capital notes that constitute between 6% and 10% of total assets. SIVs operate on a marked-to-market basis and must meet strict liquidity, capitalization, leverage and concentration guidelines whose violation leads to limitations on the vehicles' operations and eventually to liquidation. The asset portfolio is typically managed by the sponsoring institution. Even though general characteristics about the portfolio (e.g.: type of assets, industry concentration) are part of the programs and are monitored by rating agencies, the speci…c assets held are considered by sponsors as proprietary information and not disclosed. Finally, sponsors in their role of administrators of the vehicles obtain fees that are proportional to their net pro…ts. 41 40 Formally, there is a distinction between full credit support in which the sponsor has to pay o¤ maturing ABCP in all circumstances and full liquidity support in which the sponsor has to pay it o¤ only if the conduit's assets are not in default. In practice, liquidity support gives the same level of protection to the investors because ABCP investors can withdraw before assets enter into default. Preferable regulatory treatment of liquidity support has led most sponsors to use it for their fully supported conduits (see Acharya et al., 2013) . 41 For more institutional details on SIVs and a description of the other types of ABCP conduits see Moody's
The …rst SIV was launched by Citibank in 1988 and at the zenith of the sector in July 2007 there were 34 SIVs with a total of $400 billion of assets, outstanding ABCP of $97 billion (7.5% of the ABCP market) and MTN of $270 billion. Banks sponsored 19 of the SIVs, that accounted for 85% of the assets managed by the sector. The largest player in the market was Citibank which sponsored seven SIVs with 101$ billion of assets (25% of the market), which constituted a 5% of its on-balance sheet assets and 110% of its Tier 1 capital. Other important bank sponsors were HSBC (12%) and Dresdner Bank (10%).
When investors became nervous about the location of toxic subprime assets in August 2007, they stopped rolling over ABCP or required very high yields in order to do so. The run was more pronounced on SIVs due to the lack of full support from their sponsors (Covitz et al., 2013) , and led two non-bank sponsored SIVs to default on their ABCP on August 22.
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Problems aggravated in September when Moody's downgraded and placed under negative review the ratings of several SIVs. 43 On September 20, Sachsen Funding Ltd was the …rst SIV to be rescued. 44 Fearing the potential destabilizing e¤ect of massive …re sales from SIVs trying to obtain liquidity in order to repay ABCP at maturity, the US Treasury tried to coordinate a private bail out of the SIV sector. This government supported plan led Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America to propose in October the creation of the Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, also known as Super SIV, a conduit partially capitalized by these institutions that would buy the highest-quality assets of SIVs with liquidity needs. However, problems in attracting external investors to the Super SIV delayed its creation and, after the failure of two additional SIVs, HSBC announced the rescue of its two SIVs in November 26. Under the pressure from market commentators and participants who commonly alluded to the reputation of the sponsors, other banks followed HSBC and announced rescue plans for their sponsored SIVs in the subsequent dates. On December 14, Citigroup announced the rescue of its seven SIVs and the creation of the Super SIV was abandoned. By February 2008 all sponsoring banks had announced their intentions to rescue their vehicles.
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Investors Service (2003) or Arteta et al. (2013) . 42 Golden Key Ltd, sponsored by the investment manager Avendis Financial Services Ltd, and Mainsail II Ltd, sponsored by the hedge fund Solent Capital Ltd. 43 At the end of July Moody's had published a Special Report with the title "SIVs: An Oasis of Calm in the Sub-prime Maelstrom". This complete change of assessment is indicative of the level of imperfect information on the sectors'exposure to subprime risk. 44 The rescuer was the German landesbank LB Baden-Württemberg that had acquired with public support at the end of August the sponsor of this SIV, Sachsen LB. The latter needed the bail out due to the losses incurred as a result of the run on its supported ABCP conduits.
45 IKB Deutsche Industriebank was bailed out by a consortium of banks leaded by the German state owned bank KfW in August 2007 due to its exposure to Rhineland FCC, a hybrid ABCP conduit. Rhinebridge Plc, the SIV sponsored by IKB defaulted on October 16 while IKB was merged with KfW. Hong Kong Although the particular details on how rescues were structured di¤ered across banks, they all amounted to a de facto transfer of the vehicle assets on balance sheet, the full repayment of senior debtholders and the end of the operation of the SIV as a going concern. For example, HSBC rescue and restructuring plan for his sponsored SIVs considered the exchange of maturing debt by similar debt issued by a newly created and fully supported conduit to which the SIVs'assets would be transfered.
In October 2008 Moody's announced the closure of the ABCP program of Sigma Finance Corp., putting an end to this twenty year old industry.
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Using the de…nitions of j (X; D; p) in (6), V j (X; R) in (2) and M j (X; D; p) in (7), after some straightforward manipulation the expression in (8) is obtained.
From now on I assume R(X; D; p) < 1: Using (4) and (5) and the de…nition of the mispricings in (7) we obtain:
and from here the equality
For j = g; b; we have:
where F j (y) denotes the cdf of Y j : Since Y g strictly …rst order stochastically dominates Y b we have that
based Standard Chartered Bank announced the rescue of its vehicle Whistlejacket Capital Ltd on November 2007, but the vehicle defaulted on February 2008 prior to completing its rescue. These were the only bank sponsored SIVs to default, arguably because their intended rescues arrived too late. 46 The non SIV segment of the ABCP market was also severely disrupted by the …nancial crisis and has been declining since. The outstanding ABCP in September 2013 is $273 billion, around 20% of its size in June 2007.
By construction R(X; D; p) satis…es:
Di¤erentiating wrt D the equation above we obtain:
and therefore:
Now, di¤erentiating wrt D in the de…nition of M b (X; D; p) in (7) we get:
where in the last equality we have used (26). From inequality (24) we immediately conclude that 0 < @M b (X;D;p) @D < 1 if p > 0: Di¤erentiating equation (27) wrt D again and using (23), (26) we obtain:
Now, Y g M LR Y b implies straightforwardly that for p > 0 and y > 0:
and using this inequality in equation (28) we conclude that
is homogeneous of degree one in X; D we have the Euler identity:
and using that
Also, di¤erentiating implicitly wrt p in (25) we obtain:
and since V g (X; R) > V b (X; R) we deduce that @R(X;D;p) @p < 0:Using the de…nition of M b (X; D; p):
The results for M g (X; D; p) are either direct consequence of those for M b (X; D; p) using equation (22) or their proofs are analogous.
Proof of Lemma 2 If a bad bank weakly prefers to rescue we must have that:
Let us denote g(y) = ((Z + 1)y R 1 )
The function g(y) is continuous and inequality (29) simply states that R g(y)f b (y)dy 0: For y max
we have g(y) = y R 1 + R 0 and g(y) is strictly positive for y su¢ ciently high.
If
then it is easy to check that g(y) is always non negative, and then trivially we have that R g(y)f g (y)dy > 0 and the good bank strictly prefers to rescue. If, on the other hand
; then one can check that g(y) 0 for y 2 (0; R 1 R 0 ] and g(y) > 0 for y > R 1 R 0 : Let us denote y 1 = R 1 R 0 . We can rewrite R g(y)f b (y)dy 0 as
Let us now use that Y g M LR Y b to obtain the following inequalities:
for all y < y 1 and y 0 > y 1 :
Using inequalities (30), (31) and the fact that g(y) < 0 for y < y 1 we have the following sequence of inequalities:
and comparing the extremes of the inequality we deduce that R 1 0 g(y)f g (y)dy > 0 and thus a good bank strictly prefers to rescue.
Proof of Corollary 1
The …rst step is to prove that a pooling equilibrium with no rescue does not exist. Indeed, using Lemma 2 re…nement D1 implies that investors should believe that a bank that deviates and rescues is good. But then, good banks would strictly prefer to rescue because they would not su¤er mispricing losses and on top of this they would make a pro…t on the rescue of their vehicles since
Therefore in equilibrium at least a bank of type j 2 fg; bg rescues. Let us suppose that rescues are …nanced, i.e. R 1;F < 1: If j = b and bad banks …nd it weakly optimal to rescue, then Lemma 2 implies that all good banks rescue in equilibrium. If j = g but not all good banks rescue then good banks would be indi¤erent between rescuing and not and Lemma 2 states that bad banks would …nd it optimal not to rescue. Therefore banks that rescue are necessarily good and in equilibrium investors would perceive them as such. But then again good banks would strictly prefer to rescue.
For future use in the proof of Proposition 2, we have so far proved wihtout any restriction on the solvency or not of the aggregate …nancial sector that if in equilibirum R 1;F < 1 then all good banks rescue.
The only thing left to prove in the corollary is that R 1;F < 1: Let us suppose on the contrary that R 1;F = 1. Since there is some bank that rescues we must have R 1;N F R 0 : If the inequality is strict then all banks …nd it optimal to rescue and p 1 = : Now the fact that R 1;F = 1 and investors do not want to …nance the rescue of an average bank means that the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent, which is a contradiction. If on the other hand R 1;N F = R 0 then due to Bayesian updating we must have p 1 = p 0 = and again R 1;F = 1 would mean that the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof that there is a semiseparating equilibrium with a fraction
of bad banks rescuing their vehicles if and only if there is a solution to equation (13) with p 1 2 ( ; 1) has been done in the main text.
If there is a pooling equilibrium we must have that (IC b ) is satis…ed which, after substituting the participation constraints of investors can be written as: If there is a separating equilibrium then we …nd analogously that (IC b ) can be written : This strict monotonicity implies that the conditions (12), (13) and (14) are exhaustive and mutually exclusive and thus the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2 I have argued in the main text that if the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent bad banks have to be fundamentally insolvent. If R 1;F < 1 investors are willing to …nance banks that rescue which in particular implies that the expected net worth of a bank that rescues is strictly positive. In addition I have proved in the proof of Corollary 1 that all good banks rescue. If all bad banks rescue as well then p 1 = but since the aggregate …nancial sector is insolvent we would have R 1;F = 1: If some bad banks don't rescue then Bayesian updating implies that p 0 = 0. Now, since bad banks are fundamentally insolvent we must have that R 0 = 1 and thus banks that do not rescue are not able to re…nance their debt and their net worth is zero. But then bad banks would strictly prefer to rescue, which is a contradiction. We conclude that in equilibrium it has to be the case that R 1;F = 1 and rescues are not …nanced. Now, if R 1;N F < R 0 all banks rescue which implies by Bayesian updating that p 1 = and is sustained with the o¤-equilibrium belief p 0 = 0: If R 1;N F = R 0 then imposing the participation constraint of investors we have p 1 = p 0 which implies that the same fraction of good banks and bad banks rescue. Finally if R 1;N F > R 0 then no bank would rescue the proof Corollary 1 shows this can never happen.
The expected net worth for every bank type j = g; b is the same in the pooling with rescue case R 1;N F = R(Z; D B ; ) < R 0 = R(Z; D B ; 0) = 1 and in the case R 1;N F = R 0 = R(Z; D B ; ) in which both types play mixed strategies in identical proportions.
Proof of Proposition 3
The results regarding the monotonicity of (D S ; D B ) with respect to D S and D B are an easy consequence of the characterization of equilibrium in Proposition 1, the properties By continuity, there exists 0 2 (0; 1) such that for all > 0 we have that:
And this means that for all > 0 the equilibrium is pooling. 
Proof of Proposition 5
in the pooling and separating frontiers, respectively. We need some prelminary results before proceding to the proof of the proposition: a. We have worth of both types of banks in the no ban economy is the same. Henceforth, the aggregate expected net worth of bank for both pairs is the same in both no ban economies. This implies that the welfare of vehicles debtholders in both no ban economies is the same. Finally, since these agents are una¤ected by the ban in the …rst economy they also are in the second, i.e. D but this would imply that the aggregate expected net worth of banks decreases, which we have proved in i) is not the case when = 1: iv) Expected net worth of good banks Let us consider the inequality:
For every D S this inequality is satis…ed for D B su¢ ciently high so that the equilibrium is pooling and the …nancial sector is close to aggregate insolvency. Since preliminary result c states that the LHS is increasing in D 47 It can be proved that they intersect but since it is not essential for the rest of the proof of this proposition I skip this proof and allow for the possibility that they do not intersect in order for my arguments to be complete. 
